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Introduction1 
           The idea of setting up a national securities commission in Canada has 
recently returned to the forefront. In October 2002, the Deputy Prime Minis-
ter and Minister of Finance of Canada asked Harold MacKay to define a 
process for determining the best securities regulatory system for Canada’s 
needs. After an investigation which indicated “a range of problems with the 
present system”2, Mr. MacKay’s recommendation was accepted: a commit-
tee was set up “to conduct the necessary review and to make recommenda-
tions to policy makers”. The report is severe:  “The current system, as pres-
ently operated, must be improved significantly, and in a prompt fashion”. 
Similarly, the five-year report of the Ontario Securities Commission begins 
by recommending the creation of a single securities commission in Canada. 
The first chapter of that report is entitled “The Need for a Single Regulator” 
and begins as follows:  “We add our voice to countless others raised in sup-
port of the urgent need for a single Canadian securities regulator. This is the 
most pressing securities regulation issue in Ontario and across Canada. We 
urge the Minister to assume a leadership role in working with her colleagues 
across the country to resolve any remaining barriers to the establishment of a 
single regulator responsible for Canada's capital markets activity.”3 
           The matter seems to have been settled.  Nevertheless, Harris (2002)4 
points out that the debate is not based on a rigorous empirical study and he 
criticizes the very limited knowledge we have of the real problems in the Ca-
nadian securities market. We are summarizing the situation in these pages in 
order to understand this apparent paradox―one in which the absence of rig- 
            
 
1 This text describes the main elements of the working document titled “Securities Regula-
tion in Canada” available at : 
 http://www.cvmq.com/upload/autresdocuments/reglementation valeurs mobilieres 3.pdf 
2 Mackay, H., Nov. 15, 2002. Letter to The Honourable John Manley, P.C., M.P. Deputy 
Prime Minister and Minister of Finance. http://www.fin.gc.ca/news02/data/02-094_1e.html. 
3 Five Year Review Committee Final Report: Reviewing the Securities Act (Ontario), March 
2003. 
4 Harris, D.A. 2002. “A Symposium on Canadian Securities Regulation: Harmonization or 
Nationalization?” White Paper. University of Toronto Capital Markets Institute. 
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orous knowledge does not exclude finding that serious problems exist and 
recommending that steps be taken quickly.  Arguments made to justify cen-
tralization of securities regulation are not new.  They have been put for-
ward several times over the last twenty years: 
-     Regulation of the Canadian financial sector is too complex and the 
existence of thirteen securities authorities (ten provinces and three 
territories) is harmful to proper market operations.  
-     Such a situation increases issuance and compliance costs, and 
thereby generally hurts the competitiveness of the Canadian market. 
Total costs of regulation, higher than in other countries, is particu-
larly harmful in Canada because of the smaller market size.  
-     Regulation is confusing and sometimes not applied, and this situa-
tion hurts both the brokerage industry as well as financing for 
growth companies. The lines between jurisdictions are not clearly 
drawn and participants may have to deal with thirteen different ju-
risdictions for penal proceedings.  The compartmentalization of Ca-
nadian securities authorities would make complex situations involv-
ing investors, intermediaries and issuers in various jurisdictions un-
manageable.  
-     Costs related to the existence of differences in provincial laws and 
multiple jurisdictions penalize businesses, intermediaries and the 
entire market in Canada.  Canada’s ability to compete in a global 
market, namely its ability to attract foreign businesses seeking eq-
uity capital and to hold on to Canadian businesses, is compromised 
due to the increased cost of capital for Canadian businesses result-
ing from the cost and complexity of transactions involving several 
jurisdictions. This situation has changed little and is even un-
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changed since the 1964 Porter Report because of the relative ineffec-
tiveness of harmonization efforts in Canada.  
-    Market globalization is an argument in favour of a single Canadian 
securities authority and Canada must speak with one voice.  
-    The Canada regulatory system responds slowly to rapid changes in 
the environment because of the need for agreement from the different 
authorities involved.  Only a single commission can handle financial 
and accounting problems such as Enron and the number of such prob-
lems is an argument in favour of a centralized regulatory authority.  
Finally, uniform regulation would avoid a race to the bottom, which 
occurs when several regulatory jurisdictions compete with each other.  
           Most arguments put forward to support the idea of the inefficiency of 
securities regulation are not supported by regulatory and finance theory, and 
are generally based only on unsupported statements. The current debate in 
the field is a new illustration of the phenomenon which Lacasse (1995)5 de-
scribes: Canadian economic and regulatory policy decisions have more often 
than not been guided by myths put forward by pressure groups rather than by 
actual knowledge resulting from rigorous, independent research.  It is dis-
turbing to realize that some are considering reforming a system which has 
not been analyzed carefully, on the basis of assertions made primarily by 
pressure groups. As a result, it was necessary to provide the basic compo-
nents for a structured analysis in order to respond to the proposals and asser-
tions made with respect to securities regulation in Canada. 
           This report, based on the CIRANO discussion paper entitled 
“Securities Regulation in Canada”6, attempts to summarize the key issues of  
 
 
5 Lacasse, F. 1995. “Mythes, savoirs et décisions politiques, ” Paris: Presses Universitaires 
de France. 
6 Document available on the Quebec Securities Commission and CIRANO web sites. 
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this debate.  Given the arguments put forward by proponents of the centrali-
zation of securities regulation described above, we felt it was important to 
review six aspects, which are discussed in the six parts of the paper. 
           We will begin by discussing one of the main arguments of the propo-
nents of centralization, which relates to the existence and lack of agreement 
of the 13 securities commissions. This is the opportunity to show how securi-
ties operations in Canada are divided and to set out the significant progress 
made towards harmonization of Canadian regulation in this field.  
           Secondly, we will analyze the arguments and evidence respecting in-
efficiency of the Canadian securities market in terms of trading costs in the 
primary and secondary markets. We will also present our own estimates of 
comparative costs for initial offerings in Canada and the United States.  
           An analysis of various other arguments generally raised to justify an 
in-depth overhaul of the securities regulatory system form the subject of the 
third part.  They are:  Canadian weakness on the international level, jurisdic-
tional conflicts, response times, accounting manipulation and the ineffective-
ness of harmonization efforts. 
           In Part four we contrast regulatory centralization with regulatory 
competition, which prevails in company law in the United States.  We also 
present the intermediate solution of reciprocal delegation on which the Euro-
pean passport system is based.  
           We will then highlight some very significant differences between the 
Canadian and American markets which make it difficult to transfer the 
American regulatory system―sometimes cited as a reference―to the Cana-
dian system.   
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           Finally, we will examine the growth of the Canadian securities mar-
ket during the last decade and the main challenges it will have to face.  De-
bate concerning the dynamism of the Canadian market is presently limited to 
only one of its components, namely the regulatory factor.  Without denying 
the importance of this factor, it is well established that dynamism of a stock 
market depends on many other factors such as trading mechanisms and costs 
and, more generally, market quality.   No study of the regulatory system 
would be complete without considering the growth and very nature of the in-
dustry being regulated.   
1.        The debate and its key issues 
           The first argument put forward by the proponents of securities cen-
tralization in Canada is that participants have to deal with thirteen securities 
commissions, thereby increasing costs and reducing the competitiveness of 
the Canadian securities market.  An analysis of the 4,131 companies for 
which a recent stock exchange symbol is available (Table 1) shows, firstly, 
that 20% of them should be considered inactive.  Also, four provinces mo-
nopolize almost all of the share issues (97%), the companies listed on an ex-
change (90%), the population (85%) and economic activity in Canada.  Thus, 
the vast majority of issuers deal with only one or two securities commissions 
and it is therefore difficult to argue that a Canadian issuer faces 13 commis-
sions.  To address almost all investors, it only has to satisfy four jurisdic-
tions, which are related through mutual review procedures for prospectuses 
and exemptive relief, under regulation which has gradually been harmonized.  
In 2003, the disparities which remain only relate to relatively limited aspects 
of securities law.   
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Table 1: Distribution of Canadian and foreign companies listed on a Canadian stock 
exchange in November 2002, based on their place of incorporation 
Source:  Cancorp Financials, November 2002, a company is inactive if it has no assets or if it has not 
filed financial statements after 2000. The place of incorporation of Canadian federally incorporated 
corporations was determined based on the location of their head office. 
           The Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) are a forum for the 
exchange of information and mutual reliance whose mission is to coordinate 
and harmonize regulation of the Canadian financial markets.  To determine 
the scope of the remaining differences between securities regulation in the 
various jurisdictions, we describe the initiatives taken by the CSA to limit the 
problems caused by the existence of multiple jurisdictions.  They are: 
-    a memorandum of understanding relating to the mutual reliance re-
view system for applications for exemptive relief, the granting of re-
ceipts for prospectuses and the acceptance of AIFs, set up through the 
adoption of the Memorandum of Understanding between all Canadian 
securities commissions.  The decision-maker in a particular securities 
authority may rely primarily on the analysis and review of the staff of 
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 Active Companies Inactive 
Companies 
 Number % Number Number % 
British Columbia 1,175 36.13 222 1,397 33.82 
Alberta 802 24.66 270 1,072 25.95 
Ontario 691 21.25 177 868 21.01 
Québec 304 9.35 54 358 8.67 
Yukon 94 2.89 30 124 3.00 
Foreign companies 80 2.46 92 172 4.16 
Manitoba 33 1.01 12 45 1.09 
Nova Scotia 24 0.74 14 38 0.92 
New Brunswick 20 0.62 5 25 0.61 
Saskatchewan 16 0.49 3 19 0.46 
Newfoundland 8 0.25  8 0.19 
Northwest Territories 3 0.09  3 0.07 
Prince Edward Island 2 0.06  2 0.05 
Total 3,252 100.00 879 4,131 100.00 
Total 
 “The Canadian Securities 
Administrators (CSA) are a forum 
for the exchange of information and 
mutual reliance whose mission is to 
coordinate and harmonize 
regulation of the Canadian 
financial markets.” 
another securities authority.  This system is known under the acronym 
MRRS (Mutual Reliance Review System). 
  -  a memorandum of understanding between the different Canadian se-
curities authorities for the purpose of regulating and simplifying the 
oversight of stock exchanges, the “SuperMOU”.  Each recognized ex-
change and recognized quotation and trade reporting system has a 
principal regulator responsible for its oversight and may have one or 
more exempting regulators.  The principal regulator informs the ex-
empting authority of its oversight activities and provides it with all 
useful information requested by it.  
-    a registration streamlining system for securities representatives, al-
lowing the efficient registration of representatives of securities firms 
with several securities authorities. 
-    national instruments and other texts of national scope, the results of 
cooperative efforts undertaken through the CSA.  The percentage of 
national instruments which are not currently harmonized is quite low.  
Most securities transactions are now governed by national instru-
ments, listed on the web sites of the provincial commissions. 
-    the Uniform Securities Legislation Project, intended to eliminate the 
remaining differences between provincial and territorial laws.  The 
project was tabled at the beginning of 2003.    
           The procedures which have been implemented do not yet embrace the 
principle of mutual recognition which has been accepted in Europe, and the 
efforts to harmonize securities legislation are not entirely complete.  The few 
differences which still remain relate to sections which could not be harmo-
nized yet due to the highly diversified nature of the Canadian market, a mar-
ket in which hundreds of mining securities from the West trade with large-
cap securities based primarily in Ontario.  They also result from the presence 
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in Canada of two different legal systems.  However, the passport system 
based on harmonized regulation is at the center of the proposal made by the 
ministers of the provinces and the territories responsible for securities which 
is found in the June 2003 consultation document.7 
2.  Regulatory costs and inefficiency  
           According to the proponents of centralization of securities regulation, 
there are serious problems of efficiency in terms of excessive costs and de-
lays resulting from compliance with statutes and regulations.  
           Firstly, it is useful to point out the absence of any rigorous analysis of 
the costs of securities regulation in Canada or, for that matter, the United 
States, probably because of the difficulty of evaluating them.  Regulation im-
plies three types of costs:  direct costs of organizations, indirect or supple-
mentary costs incurred by intermediaries to comply with such regulation, and 
distortion costs.8  A comparative estimate of direct costs is difficult because 
of differences between the regulatory structures for the financial sector in 
different countries.  Whereas the United Kingdom now has only a single au-
thority, a number of other countries regulate the banking, insurance and secu-
rities sectors separately.9  Very little empirical study has been done on show-
ing the additional costs related to regulation, and they almost all deal with  
 
7Securities Regulation in Canada: An Inter-provincial Securities Framework, Discussion 
Paper, Steering Committee of Ministers, June 2003. 
8 One of the directors of the Financial Services Authority (FSA) in the United Kingdom de-
fines these costs as follows: the ‘distortion’ cost arising from the way in which regulation 
may change the nature of markets, may prevent or discourage firms from entering or using 
markets, may constitute new markets that would not exist in the absence of regulation, and 
may therefore have a significant effect on the nature and availability of the products pro-
vided by the financial services industry. See Clive Briault : The Costs of Financial Regula-
tion, 2003,  
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/speeches/sp140.html 
9 The FSA annually produces a schedule containing the direct costs of regulatory organiza-
tions in the main countries.  The 2003 edition shows that Australia, which has just combined 
its securities commissions, has a direct cost significantly higher than that of Canada in this 
respect, for a capitalization which represents two-thirds that of Canada.  
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/annual/ar02_03/ar02_03app8.pdf 
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specific aspects of American regulation.  We are unaware of any rigorous 
study on the additional costs caused by Canadian regulation.  It is, however, 
important to mention three major factors.  They are the putting in perspective 
of regulatory costs, the taking into consideration regulatory benefits and the 
effects of regulation on initial offerings. 
Putting in perspective:  Although the costs of regulating securities are sig-
nificant, they should be put in perspective.  Issuers and investors incur vari-
ous forms of costs on the primary and secondary markets, of which regula-
tion is only one component.  These costs include four components:  the 
spread which separates the bid and ask prices, the price effect of the an-
nouncement of large orders which replaces the spread when blocks are ex-
changed on the upstairs market, brokerage fees and the cost of settling trades.   
           On the secondary market, regulatory costs are only a small fraction of 
costs incurred by issuers and investors in both Canada and the United States.  
In Canada, only trading costs can be estimated, for the year 2001, at $5.7 bil-
lion if we use as a basis the rates in effect in the United States, which would 
certainly lead to under estimating Canadian costs.  Regulation plays a small 
role at this level and the costs are essentially related to intermediary remu-
neration.  The expenses of the four main Canadian securities commissions 
are $104.09 million for the same year.  To impute solely to regulatory costs 
the relative inefficiency of the Canadian market overlooks the fact that trad-
ing costs are essentially related to market operations and brokerage commis-
sions, which are mainly the responsibility of the brokerage industry itself.  
The direct costs of regulation per $million of capitalization are $145.8 in 
Canada, $293.1 in Australia and $141.9 in the United States, if we do not in-
clude State securities regulatory organizations.  In 2002, Texas alone col-
lected fees of CDN$163 million, which is greater than the costs of all Cana-
dian commissions combined.  Each reporting issuer costs $33,600 in Canada 
in direct regulatory costs.  It costs $123,000 in Australia, where the commis-
sions have been combined, and $324,700 in the United States, according to 
Page 11  
“We are unaware of any 
rigorous study on the additional 
costs caused by Canadian 
regulation.”  
“On the secondary market, 
regulatory costs are only a small 
fraction of costs incurred by 
issuers and investors in both 
Canada and the United States.” 
data of the UK Financial Services Authority.   
Costs and benefits:  The costs of regulation must be put in perspective in re-
lation to their benefit.  With optimal regulation, the marginal cost is equal to 
the marginal benefit. Several authors believe that this balance can only be 
achieved by jurisdictional competition and criticize the regulatory monopoly 
approach.  There do not seem to be any cost/benefit studies of securities 
regulation in Canada.  
Initial offerings:  Initial offerings are probably the aspect of the securities 
business over which regulation may have the most significant effect.  The 
change from the status of closed corporation to that of issuer is subject to 
greater requirements, whereas the size of the companies is relatively small.  
The relative burden of the requirements is therefore potentially high.  Four 
studies show that the cost of initial offerings is significantly lower in Canada 
than in the United States, which does not have multiple securities commis-
sions.  The process for an initial offering is not only less costly in Canada, it 
is also more rapid.  It is thus difficult to argue that the existence of several 
securities authorities in Canada heavily penalizes the competitiveness of the 
primary securities market, especially since in both countries brokerage com-
missions constitute the greater share of total direct costs.  In addition, our 
own estimates show that costs imputable to undervaluation, unrelated to 
regulation but related to broker conduct, are on average much higher than to-
tal direct costs, especially in the United States (Table 2).  The advantage of 
Canada in terms of direct costs is around 2% of gross proceeds for an issue 
under 1 million.  It is around 1% for an issue of which the gross proceeds are 
between 1 and 100 million.  It therefore seems unlikely that regulatory costs 
are a significant factor for cost increases and a barrier to issuances.  
           There is very little evidence that the present regulatory structure 
greatly penalizes Canada:  issuers incur lower costs than in the United States, 
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direct costs appear to be lower than those in Australia, which combined the 
securities commissions, and direct costs of regulation are only a small frac-
tion of costs incurred by issuers and investors.  It is possible that the total 
level of regulation is not optimal.  However, we do not have any studies con-
firming this.  
Table 2:  Elements of IPO costs in Canada and the United States according to size of 
issue, excluding capital pool issues for the period 1997-1999. The average percentages 
are statistically different from zero to the 1% level. 
 
3.    Various arguments 
           A certain number of arguments are regularly put forward to justify 
revision of the Canadian model of securities regulation.  We will discuss 
them in turn below.  
           Canada is weak on the international level and must speak with one 
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Canada 
Size of Issue     
(US$ million) 
Number 
of IPOs 
Brokerage 
Fees   (%) 
Other Ex-
penses 
(%) 
Total Direct 
Costs  
(%) 
Under-
valuation 
(%) 
1.0 – 9.9 53 8.12% 7.86% 15.98% 30.61% 
10– 49.9 49 6.14% 3.31% 9.45% 11.30% 
50 – 99.9 10 6% 2% 8% 10.76% 
100 and over 16 5.53% 1.75% 7.28% 8.88% 
Average  6.88% 4.9% 11.78% 18.95% 
Weighted average  
(by size) 
5.35% 1.84% 7.19% 5.11%  
1.0 – 9.9 119 9.29 % 8.7 % 17.99 % 9.05 % 
10.0 – 49.9 532 6.93 % 3.70 % 10.63 % 26.15 % 
50.0 – 99.9 300 6.88 % 2.12 % 9 % 55.57 % 
100 and over 237 6.09 % 1.2 % 7.29 % 67.19 % 
Average  7 % 3.3 % 10.30 % 37.5 % 
Weighed average 
(by size) 
 5.79 % 1.43 % 7.22 % 38.38 % 
United States  
voice because of market globalization.  This argument can hardly be consid-
ered significant.  The existence and initiatives of the CSA show that the de-
gree of cooperation between securities commissions is high and common 
viewpoints strong.  The argument may therefore be reversed.  Is Canada’s 
influence not greater because it has four representatives at the international 
level (International Organization of Securities Commissions), when these 
representatives work together closely on most matters? 
           There are jurisdictional conflicts to the extent that participants may 
face thirteen different jurisdictions for penal proceedings.  Jurisdictional 
problem exists world-wide, not only in Canada, and has lead to the European 
investment service directive (ISD 93).  One of the responses to the problem 
of multiple jurisdictions is the principle of cooperation and the project to set 
up uniform securities legislation in Canada.  
           Response times to rapid changes in the environment are long because 
of the need for cooperation from the different organizations involved.  Al-
though the implementation of solutions may be more rapid in a centralized 
system, it is not clear that the detection of problems and the proposal of solu-
tions is accelerated by the creation of a single commission. Here again, pro-
ponents of regulatory competition insist that only organizations in a competi-
tive situation react quickly to changes in market conditions. 
           The accounting manipulations which lead to the American financial 
scandals would be avoided in a centralized securities system.  It seems para-
doxical to invoke financial scandals which mainly affected American busi-
nesses to support centralization of securities in Canada.  These abuses took 
place mainly in a country where securities regulation respecting large com-
panies is essentially under the jurisdiction of the federal government and a 
single commission, the SEC.  In addition, the wish of the American federal 
government to impose a uniform securities law seems to have had indirect 
negative effects including the recent financial scandals.  These interventions 
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are seen by some scholars as the direct, although partial, cause of the recent 
financial scandals.  The exclusion of the States from securities litigation of a 
national scope has eliminated several lawsuits and does not seem to have al-
lowed the harmonization of decisions.  However, this effect was reinforced 
by the inaction and lack of means of the central securities organization, the 
SEC.  This is especially true as observers generally believe that a lack of en-
forcement, not regulation, in particular by the SEC, is the origin of the recent 
scandals10. Based on the American example, it does not seem that the Enron 
affair can be a very solid argument for the harmonization of securities legis-
lation in Canada.    
           For proponents of centralization, the efforts at uniformity are ineffec-
tive.  Despite national instruments and current initiatives, securities legisla-
tion is not completely harmonized.  The cooperation process set up through 
the CSA is relatively recent and certain major initiatives were put in place 
after 1997 (MRRS, SEDAR).  The harmonization process is continuing.  
However, it is not clear that complete uniformity is desirable.  The very di-
verse nature of the Canadian market and local peculiarities mean that it can 
be considered a group of markets rather than a single market.  Most studies, 
however, seem to minimize the level of uniformity set up by the CSA.  A 
study of the national instruments shows, however, that they now govern a 
large part of the securities business.   
           The regulatory burden prevents growth companies from having ac-
cess to financing.  Provisions for private placements are still different de-
pending on the Canadian jurisdiction, in particular for sophisticated inves-
tors, although efforts at uniformity have been made and are ongoing.  The  
 
10 See, on this issue, Coffee, J.C. 2002. “Understanding Enron : It’s About the Gatekeepers, 
Stupid”, Columbia Law School, Center for Law and Economics Studies. SSRN Working 
Paper, and “Financial Oversight of Enron : The SEC and Private-Sector Watchdogs”, Re-
port of the Staff to the Senate Comity on Governmental Affairs, 2002,  
http://www.senate.gov/~gov_affairs/enron100702.htm.  
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increased number of initial offerings, in particular for venture capital, the 
high mortality and the weak accounting and market performance of new 
listed companies leads us to believe that Canadian regulation gives start-up 
companies access to the stock market too easily.   
           The various arguments put forward to justify the creation of a single 
commission are therefore not very convincing.  The benefits of the present 
system are systematically omitted from the debate and centralization is often 
presented as the only solution to the various problems raised.  This solution 
leads to a regulatory monopoly, a model criticized by many scholars.   
4.    Regulatory competition 
           Arguments put forward by proponents of regulatory centralization as-
sume that a single authority would be able to regulate the securities industry 
in an optimal manner and at a lower cost. Perfectly homogeneous regulation 
would be preferable to the current situation.  This idea is opposed to the mar-
ket approach, which exists particularly in the field of company law in the 
United States.  According to this approach, internal and external competition 
between regulatory bodies should lead to less complete and stable uniformity 
than that of centralization, but more in keeping with the real needs of partici-
pants. Between the two extremes there is a middle position such as reciprocal 
delegation, on which the European passport system is based.    
           For several authors, regulatory competition is therefore a necessary 
condition to counterbalance the excessive power of central authorities who 
do not necessarily act to maximize social well-being and to allow mecha-
nisms which can lead to maximum social utility to be set up. The counter-
argument to this proposal is based on the race to the bottom concept: placed 
in a competitive situation, organizations are encouraged to reduce their re-
quirements to attract trading and issuers. Aside from the fact that such behav-
iour adversely affects the local market by increasing risk and the cost of capi-
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tal for issuers, there are various mechanisms allowing limits to be placed on 
the race to the bottom, in particular the establishment of minimum common 
standards.  Some evidence suggests, however, that a race to the top and not 
to the bottom exists in the securities field where, traditionally, the most ex-
acting jurisdictions have attracted a greater number of issuers and investors.   
            Competition in company law in the United States seems to have led 
to the emergence of relatively uniform laws in the various States, although 
certain authors have criticized this model.  Competition has been lead by the 
State of Delaware, where more than half of American corporations are incor-
porated and which, between 1996 and 2000, incorporated 90.22% of new 
companies which chose a State other than their State of origin.  This move-
ment does not seem to be to the detriment of investors, as changes from the 
place of incorporation to Delaware seem to be perceived positively by the 
stock market.  American specialists, such as Roberta Romano of Yale Uni-
versity, suggest that the competition prevailing in company law be applied to 
securities law.   
            In the securities field, subject to constant changes, rapidity of adapta-
tion to laws and regulations and quick detection of problems and tendencies 
is essential.  The European system of mutual recognition allows a certain de-
gree of competition.  That system does not lead to the disappearance of local 
authorities, which several countries are currently strengthening.  It also al-
lows the existence of differences which can take into consideration the dis-
tinctiveness of various countries.  As with the European market, the Cana-
dian securities market is diverse in terms of types of companies and provin-
cial initiatives.  Because of its regulatory structure, Canada has found itself 
over the years in a system of imperfect regulatory competition.  The various 
jurisdictions can set up different rules, but issuers and intermediaries remain 
subject to the jurisdiction of the province where they operate or offer securi-
ties.  Such a system encourages innovation.  The creation of programs such 
as stock savings plans in Quebec, capital pools in Alberta and negotiated bro-
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kerage fees are examples of innovation begun in one province and copied in 
others.   
           The European situation combines regulatory competition for securi-
ties and minimal standards.  The current steps following the Lamfalussy re-
port, revision of ISD 93, new directives on prospectuses and the FSAP con-
stitute various means used by the European Community to ease dysfunctions 
in the mutual recognition system initiated in 1993.  The absence of minimum 
standards and mechanisms allowing their development and implementation 
explains the lack of success of the process of mutual recognition set up in 
1993. The objective of recent steps, and in particular those following the 
Lamfalussy report, is to implement the minimum standards required for the 
system of mutual recognition to function properly, and not to provide for the 
creation of a single securities commission in Europe.  There is already a fo-
rum allowing the setting up of common standards in Canada, and minimum 
common standards exist in almost all areas.  Nothing therefore prevents set-
ting up a passport system.   
           A system of regulatory monopoly is not necessarily preferable to that 
of regulatory competition.  Each of the two systems has advantages but the 
present debate only mentions the disadvantages, either real or perceived, of 
the existing system.  It is true that in the absence of a uniformity effort allow-
ing mutual recognition, a partitioned system has clear disadvantages.  How-
ever, the Canadian market has greatly evolved over two decades and the op-
tion chosen by the European Community should be seriously considered, es-
pecially since the American model, often cited as an example, certainly can-
not be transferred into Canada. 
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5.   Canadian and American financial systems:  competition and regula-
tion  
           The American situation is often put forward as an example of regula-
tory centralization and its implementation within a federal state.  There are, 
however, significant differences between the two markets.    
           The American financial market is very fragmented, both in banking 
and securities.  Regulatory centralization may be best in such a case, al-
though a number of researchers dispute this. Regulatory monopoly is, how-
ever, only apparent: it does not exist for banking or company law, and is only 
partial for securities.  The United States General Accounting Office states 
that in March 2002, the SEC oversaw nine exchanges, the over-the-counter 
market and seventy alternate trading systems, as well as twelve clearing 
houses.  The American banking and securities markets include a very large 
number of participants, which strongly compete with each other.  The United 
States has regulatory competition for company law.  In the banking sector, a 
dual system was set up, allowing a certain degree of competition.  Securities 
regulation is segmented, with small local issues being governed locally.  The 
SEC may be considered a regulatory monopoly with respect to important se-
curities, in the face of a competitive and fragmented industry.  In securities in 
particular, the United States is considered to have onerous, costly and strict 
regulation.  This regulation applies to companies very different from those in 
Canada, where small issues predominate.  The SEC is considered to be inef-
ficient, slow and lacking resources.  The Unites States is therefore not a 
model of regulatory centralization in the various areas related to the financial 
sector.  In terms of lawsuits involving securities, centralization is highly criti-
cized and sometimes linked to the series of recent stock market scandals. 
           On the contrary, the Canadian financial system is highly concen-
trated, as shown in Table 3, which presents various concentration data.  For 
the Task Force on the Future of Canadian Financial Services (MacKay let-
ter), Canada was the developed country with the most concentrated banking 
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sector in 1997.  The method used by the Royal Bank gives a ratio of Cana-
dian concentration of 46% as opposed to 81% for the MacKay letter, which 
means that Canada comes after Switzerland and the Netherlands.  However, 
the study by the Bank for International Settlements confirms the MacKay let-
ter data and also shows strong growth in the concentration, which increased 
from 60.2 to 77.1% from 1990 to 1997.  Such an increase is not seen in any 
other country.  Only the United States is experiencing similar growth, but the 
concentration index was only 11.3% in 1990.  Canada, along with the Neth-
erlands, seems to be the OECD country where the banking sector is the most 
concentrated.  Despite this already high concentration, the largest banks have 
tried several times to merge.  In 2001 the six main integrated firms belonging 
to the six largest Canadian banks had more than 70% of the business in the 
industry.  All the large integrated brokerage firms in Canada therefore belong 
to six banks representing more than 90% of the total banking assets in 2002.  
These institutions are heavily involved in the holding of exchanges and in the 
boards of directors of various self-regulatory organizations, where they hold 
the majority of seats (54%) as opposed to 8% for issuers and none for inves-
tors.  
           Canada has only one exchange group, two clearing agencies, one 
regulatory service and a few alternative trading systems, which are mostly 
under the direct or indirect control of the large banks and their broker sub-
sidiaries.  To our knowledge, no developed country presents such a high 
level of banking, financial and self-regulatory concentration.  The financial 
aspect is governed by provincial securities commissions.  Centralization pro-
posals for regulation of securities-related responsibilities will, faced with 
such a group, lead to a single securities commission.  The establishment of a 
national commission would lead to regulatory monopoly.  Authorization of 
the mergers of banks, which own the main brokerage firms, and the growing 
concentration in this sector, seems to be leading Canada to oligopoly.  Ac-
cording to the forecasts of regulatory theoreticians, a situation where a regu-
latory monopoly governs an oligopoly is potentially dangerous.  This cannot 
be ignored in the present discussion surrounding the restructuring of securi-
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ties regulation in Canada.   
 
Table 3:  Ratio of concentration in the Canadian banking sector according to various 
studies 
 
1:  Task Force on the Future of Canadian Financial Services:  Competition, Competitiveness and the 
Public Interest Background Paper No. 1, September 1998. 
2:  Royal Bank of Canada, Canada’s Banks: A Strategic Asset, Spring 1998. 
3:  Group of Ten, Report on Consolidation in the Financial Sector, available at www.bis.org, January 
2001. 
4:  The ratio equals the total banking assets of the five largest banks over total banking assets.  
5:  The ratio equals the total banking assets of the five largest banks over total assets of all financial 
institutions.  
6:  Indeterminate method of calculation. 
7:  Data from the United Kingdom and Germany are dated 1998 and that of Switzerland 1997. 
 
Source:  MacKay letter, Royal Bank of Canada study and Group of Ten Report. 
 
 
           The American regulatory framework is complex.  The regulation of 
local issues has remained the responsibility of the States, and these issues 
constitute the vast majority of Canadian issues.  The American system has 
not proven its effectiveness and nothing therefore leads us to believe that the 
American securities regulatory model can be transferred to Canada.  More-
over, the very high concentration of the Canadian financial sector makes a 
regulatory solution based on a single body dangerous.    
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19974 19975 19906 19977 
Switzerland 71 % 80 % 53.2 % 57.8 % 
Australia 69 % -- 72.1 % 73.9 % 
Netherlands 75 % 57 % 73.7 % 82.2 % 
Canada 81 % 46 % 60.2 % 77.1 % 
France -- 36 % 67.8 % 69.3 % 
United Kingdom 40 % 19 % 43.54 % 35.2 % 
Japan -- 12 % 31.8 % 29.1 % 
United States 19 % 7 % 11.3 % 25.56 % 
Germany 15 % 20 % 17.1 % 18.8 % 
Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS)3 
           The preceding sections should not make anyone believe that the Ca-
nadian securities market is not threatened.  It faces considerable challenges, 
but they do not appear to have been created by the provincial regulatory 
structure.    
6.    Growth of the Canadian securities market:  findings and challenges  
           According to the proponents of centralization for securities, regula-
tory decentralization and multiple securities commissions would impair the 
development of the Canadian stock market.  As there is little information on 
this market, we will look at its growth over the past decade and point out the 
special features of the Canadian securities market.   
           It is distinguished from other developed markets by the presence of 
many small-cap companies:  in 2002, 67% of operating corporations had 
shareholder equity of less than $10 million and less than 600 could be listed 
on the NASDAQ.  In addition, the Canadian market in characterized by the 
presence of many new companies.  On average, 189 new public offerings are 
conducted each year.  The Canadian market is also distinguished by the high 
mortality of listed corporations.   
           Table 4 shows the growth of capitalization of the main OECD coun-
tries, according to S&P data.  We have corrected the Canadian capitalization 
to make it consistent between 1990 and 2000 and to neutralize the effect of 
the stock exchange restructuring.  Canadian stock market capitalization has 
more than tripled during the last decade, increasing from US$242 billion at 
the end of 1990 to US$771 billion in 2002.  In 2000, Canada ranked behind 
France, Germany and Switzerland.  The market capitalization of Germany 
tripled in 10 years, whereas that of Japan stagnated.  If these variations are 
corrected to neutralize variations in the market index (Table 4, Panel B), the 
real Canadian capitalization increase is, however, much lower than that of 
other countries (with the exception of Japan).  The net Canadian capital cre-
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ated was only 16% in ten years, as opposed to 62% in France, 52% in the 
United Kingdom and Germany and 24% in the United States.  Real Canadian 
capitalization growth and trading volume is slow, not very different from that 
of the economy, and the relative position of Canada in relation to the main 
countries of the OECD is worsening. Canada is unattractive for foreign cor-
porations and the presence of foreign corporations is symbolic:  more than 
99.9% of the trading value in such securities is outside the Canadian market.  
It appears that the Canadian stock market is no longer attracting trading in 
foreign stocks.  On the other hand, the American market captures a signifi-
cant share of trading in large Canadian inter-listed companies.  More than 
one-third of heavily traded Canadian stocks are now traded in the United 
States rather than in Canada. This is a very worrisome situation, given the 
importance of a stock market for a country.    
 
Table 4:  Ranking of the first 6 countries at the end of 1990 and 2000 by mar-
ket capitalization, distribution of market capitalization in billions of US$, ac-
cording to S&P data.  Panel A shows gross data, panel B shows data net of 
index fluctuations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources:  Standard & Poors, Emerging Stock Market Fact Book, New York, 2000 and 2001. TSE Re-
view 1993 and 2001, Five-Year Statistical Summary, Bank of Canada exchange rate at the end of the 
year, and market index per country from Datastream.         
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Panel A Variation % 
2000 1990 
Rank Capitalization Rank Capitalization 
United States 393.76 1 15,104 1 3,059 
Japan 8.19 2 3,157 2 2,918 
United Kingdom 203.53 3 2,577 3 849 
France 360.83 4 1,447 5 314 
Germany 257.75 5 1,270 4 355 
Canada corrected 218.60 7 771 6 242 
Panel B Variation % 2000 Net Capitalization 
1990 
Net Capitalization 
United States 23.50 3,778 3,059 
Japan -29.34 2,062 2,918 
United Kingdom 51.83 1,289 849 
France 62.10 509 314 
Germany 52.39 541 355 
Canada corrected 16.12 281 242 
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           The Canadian market is not the dominant market (where the majority 
of trades take place) for foreign securities, and it is progressively losing its 
role as the dominant market for high-volume Canadian securities. This phe-
nomenon might grow, as models predict that the transfer of trading will con-
tinue to gravitate to the country offering the most favourable trading condi-
tions. In addition, the upstairs market is developing rapidly, and only 30% of 
the total trading value for Canadian securities is now done on the regular To-
ronto market. This situation is generally seen as a problem and the NYSE, 
for example, greatly limits this practice.   
           A study of factors leading investors to prefer one market over another 
shows that the Canadian securities market is facing important challenges. 
The factors which attract investors and issuers are mainly market quality, the 
registration effect, and the corporate visibility effect.   
Market quality:  Investors and issuers are attracted by highly liquid markets, 
where large block trades of securities have minimal effect and where trading 
costs are the lowest possible.  Issuers are also attracted by markets where 
they can raise large amounts, which is related to market size.  They also at-
tach great importance to the following of stocks by securities analysts. 
The registration effect:  Companies choose markets where disclosure stan-
dards are more strict than the country of origin to benefit from the registra-
tion effect and a lower cost of capital.  The Canadian market is facing a di-
lemma.  Should disclosure and governance standards be realigned with the 
new American standards for disclosure and governance set out in the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act or, on the contrary, should they be softened to meet a more 
local dimension in keeping with the requirements of small-cap companies?   
The corporate visibility effect:  Having its securities traded on an American 
market is seen as prestigious.  Some companies whose products are sold in 
the United States also seek to make their customers their shareholders.       
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           There are obstacles to the transfer of companies to the US market.  
The main one seems to be related to the costs incurred by the application of 
American accounting principles11.  The harmonization of national instru-
ments should progressively eliminate this cost, as the multijurisdictional dis-
closure system seems to have eliminated the additional costs related to com-
pliance with SEC requirements.  The progression of trades to the United 
States should therefore continue.  It represents a major challenge to the Cana-
dian securities market.  The TSX is meeting the criteria of world markets less 
and less.  It corresponds more to a regional market, defined according to 
Galper (1999)12 as follows:  the Regional Exchange dominates its local econ-
omy.  It has the greatest concentration of regional listings available and is 
the chief expert in these listings. By virtue of its intense national concentra-
tion, its index becomes a barometer of the health of the publicly quoted part 
of the regional economy. It may trade securities and derivative products.  It 
draws its clientele primarily from regional investors, with a smaller share of 
international investors interested in benefiting from the available expertise 
and opportunities.  The TSX Venture Exchange is apparently a small and 
medium business market (SMB, Schulman, 1999), a category in which the 
NASDAQ also falls.  To the extent that Canada has less than 600 corpora-
tions which can be listed and traded on the NASDAQ, the TSX should also 
be in that category.  This appears to be all the more true as trading in large-
cap securities progressively gravitates to the American market. The implica-
tions are significant, in terms of development and regulatory strategy. The 
main aspect to be considered for SMB exchanges is proximity:  an exchange 
provides a real estate function for companies in the sense that it is where 
companies locate their stock listings and it is where customers (investors) 
come to buy and sell that stock.  Therefore, to enhance the profile of an SMB 
market, exchanges should create attractive SMB market communities with  
 
 
11 Houston, C.O. and R.A. Jones, “Canadian Manager Perceptions of the US Exchange List-
ings : Recent Evidence”, Journal of International Financial Management and Accounting 13: 
3, 2002, 235-253. 
12 Galper, J. 1999. “Three Business Models for the Stock Exchange Industry,” World Federa-
tion of Stock Exchanges. 
http://www.world-exchanges.org/index.asp?resolutionX=1280&resolutionY=1024 
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financial influence, recognized value, and uniquely beneficial services 
(Schulman, 1999, p.14).13  As the few large-cap securities are gravitating to 
American markets, it seems inescapable that the Canadian market will pro-
gressively become a market of medium and small companies by international 
standards. 
           The Canadian securities market is therefore facing major challenges 
in terms of public policy. A revision of the current regulatory structure is 
probably not an essential aspect of the situation. The progression of trades to 
the United States, the smaller and smaller portion of trades carried out on the 
downstairs market, and the total lack of attraction to Canada by foreign secu-
rities are more problematic. The stakes are high and cannot be ignored in the 
debate taking place in Canada. The factors of location, adaptation to different 
regional and sector factors, the framework of small-cap securities, the switch 
from risk capital to public financing and the survival of new issues will be-
come major factors. Moreover, the reduction of real or perceived advantages 
from the transfer of trading to the United States should become a subject of 
study and careful thought.  
7.        Conclusion 
           The Canadian securities market is confronted with major challenges. 
It faces direct competition from a much larger market, where various market 
systems compete fiercely with each other. A serious review of the factors 
which encourage the migration of cross-border trading, and which seriously 
limit trading of foreign securities in Canada, is warranted. It appears difficult 
to impute to the provincial regulatory structure these difficulties which es-
sentially affect the secondary market and the costs of which are mostly re-
lated to stock exchange operations and brokers. 
 
 13 Schulman, A. 1999. “Small and Medium Size Business Markets,” World Federation of 
Stock Exchanges.  
http://www.world-exchanges.org/index.asp?resolutionX=1280&resolutionY=1024. 
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           Regulation is often presented as a cost factor and an impediment to 
new issues, which are relatively numerous and comparatively inexpensive as 
compared to similar operations conducted in the United States. No study has 
shown that the current regulatory structure disadvantages Canadian issues. 
The analysis of prospectuses and applications for exemptive relief is also 
more rapid in Canada. While we are not saying that there is no room for im-
provement, it must be admitted that the argument of the negative effects of 
the regulatory system on Canadian issues has not been proven. 
           The proposed centralized model would change with respect to har-
monization of securities legislation which, to a great extent, is now governed 
by national standards.  It would create a regulatory monopoly, a dangerous 
situation given the very high concentration of the regulated industry, and 
would cause the loss in Canada of the benefits of regulatory competition 
which currently prevails.  There are few arguments to the effect that such a 
structure would reduce direct costs and the Australian example seems to indi-
cate the opposite. On the contrary, a system based on harmonization and mu-
tual recognition (the passport) presents advantages which have lead the Euro-
pean Community to opt for this system of securities regulation. 
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